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On the Irreplaceability of Animal Life
As animal rights becomes a fash
ionable topic of debate within the aca
demic community, we see a spate of
arguments emerging which deny or
conflict with the fundamental moral
principles of equal consideration of
interests. 1
Whatever the motivation
for such arguments, the practical
result is the putative justification of
the
continued
use,
abuse,
and
slaughter of non-human animals for
man's own purposes--purposes which
are by no means consistent with the
telos of the animals themselves.
One
example
is
the
so-called
"replacement argument,"
the
very
name of which calls attention to the
traditional view of animals as mere
things, interchangeable from the point
of
view of
human
utility.
The
replacement a rgument derives from
classical utilitarianism,2 but has been
recently revived with various modifi
cations. 3
Such an argument could
only have emerged within the context
of a world view which takes it for
granted that animals exist primarily
for the benefit of human beings. The
argument may be outlined as follows:
Provided that:
1. an animal's life is on the
whole "worth living," i.e.,
involves more pleasu re than
pain,
2. the animal would not have
existed at all had it not
been del iberately brought
into existence by man, and
3. The animal will be replaced
after its death by another
an imal for whom conditions
#1 and #2 hold true,
Then:
the person or persons who
brought that animal into exis
tence may use and kill it as
they see fit.
Now

the fundamental

principle of

utilitarianism, in all its varieties, is
that pleasure is a good and pain an
evil.
I n the argument above, condi
tions #1 and #2 are intended to guar
antee that the animal is "compensated"
for any pain inflicted upon it.
Con
dition #3 is intended to guarantee that
"the world" is "compensated" for any
pain inflicted upon it as a result of
the killing of the animal.
But is such a compensation in fact
possible? Can the unnecessary inflic
tion of pain and death on non-human
animals be morally justified? My aim
here is to demonstrate that rigorous
(but undogmatic) adherence to the
principle that pain is an intrinsic evil
entails the rejection of the replacement
argument.
I shall also try to show that, while
developed within the framework of
utilitarian thinking, this argument is
inconsistent with utilitarianism, as well
as our ordinary moral intuitions.
Finally, I shall consider how the
argument would have to be modified in
order to square with classical utilita
rianism, the premise that pain is an
intrinsic evil, and our ordinary moral
intuitions.
If the assumption that
pain is an intrinsic evil is correct and
my reasoning is sound, then we are
morally obliged to desist from the
overwhelming majority of practices and
uses of animals to which we are pres
ently accustomed.

-1
What does it mea n for someth i ng to
be an intrinsic evil?
If something is
evil in itself, that means that it is not
evil relative to something else. Con
sequently, it can't be justified by any
good which may result from it, nor be
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weighed against resultant good
determining how we shold act.

in

If, then, pain is an intrinsic evil,
under what conditions, if any, is it
morally justified to inflict it? Let us
consider several possible cases.
In
each case we shall ask whether the
infliction of pain is justified in terms
of our premise that pain is an intrin
sic evil, in terms of classical utilita
rianism, and in terms of our ordinary
moral intuitions. Examination of these
various cases will enable us to judge
whether or not the replacement argu
ment is valid.

1.
No
pleasure
bestowed
or
resulting; no resultant relief of pain
Where pain is inflicted which results
neither in pleasure nor the relief of
pain, and the being is not "compen
sated" by the subsequent bestowal of
pleasure, it is analytically obvious
that such conduct is morally wrong, if
pain is an intrinsic evil.
It is also
wrong according to utlitarianism, since
to so act is in no way to promote the
balance
of
pleasure
over
pain.
Finally, it is in obvious violation of
our ordinary moral intuitions.
2.
Greater pleasure bestowed In
this case, the animal is "compensated"
to some degree for the infliction of
pain by the subsequent bestowal of
greater pleasure. The pain, however,
is in no way necessary to the enjoy
. ment of the pleasure.
If pain is
intrinsically evil, it obviously cannot
be cancelled out by the unrelated
bestowal of pleasure.
Utilitarianism
wou Id also reject this case as immoral,
since in inflicting the pain one is not
acting in such a way as to maximize
pleasure.
Our
moral
intuitions
conti ,':11 these concl usions. Most of us
would be '!owilling to operate· on the
principle thai: it is morally right to
wrong provided one does more right
than wron:J.
.

3. Resultant greater pleasure This
case is based on a strong version of
the principle that the end justifies the
means.
Here the infliction of pain
results in greater pleasure:
for the
"world,"· other individuals, or the
being himself.
If pain is an intrinsic
evil, however, it is not commensurable
with pleasure, i.e., cannot be can
celled out by, or weighed against
resultant pleaure in determining the
moral . value of a
particular act.
Where the totality of pleasure in the
world is increased as a result of the
infliction of pain, it is theoretically
possible that the individual level. of
happiness of all the beings concerned
might be reduced.
For example, by
reducing the level of individual com
fort in an ameliorated factory farm,
the farmer may be able to house more
chickens under conditions which pre
serve a slight balance of pleasure
over pain for individual chickens,
while at the same time creating a total
level of happiness which is greater
than before.
.
Consequently, not all versions of
utilitarianism would accept such con
duct as morally justified. It would be
inconsistent, for example, wth Bent
ham's principle of "the greatest hap
pi ness of the greatest number." Ou r
moral intuitions confirm that it is not
justified to inflict pain on someone
else to increase the world's total level
of happiness or pleasure.
Where
it
is other
individuals,
rather than "the world," who experi
ence an increase in pleasure as a
result of the infliction of pain, classi
cal utilitarianism would, in principle,
accept such conduct as morally justi
fied since it promotes a balance of
pleasu re over pain. As in the previ
ous . case, our ordinary moral intui
tions, and the premise that pain is an
intrinsic evil tell us that it is morally
wrong to inflict pain on one being to
promote pleasure in another.
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Even where the infliction of pain
results in greater pleasure for the
being himself, the premise that pain is
an intrinsic evil would prohibit such
conduct as morally unjustified.
An
individual may indeed choose to suffer
lesser pain for the sake of enjoying
greater pleasure,
but if pain is
intrinsically evil, then no one else has
the right to presume that he would
make this choice, or to inflict pain on
a being "for his own good." Utilita
rianism, of course, would regard such
conduct as morally justified since pain
and pleasure can be weighed against
each other. Our ordinary moral intu
itions appear ambiguous in this case.
If no problematic examples are cited,
most of us would probably regard the
principle expressed here as justified.
Cou nter-examples,
however,
easily
come to mind. We may admit that the
pleasure which eventually results from
a child prodigy's being coerced by his
parents into long, grueling hours of
practice at the piano is greater than
the pain the child suffered as a result
of being deprived of the normal joys
of childhood, without being willing to
acknowledge that the parents' actions
were morally justified.
The price of
suffering the pain may be "too great"
even where the pleasure that results
is greater.
'I.
Prevention or relief of greater
suffering in others Th is case is by
far the most difficult and problematic,
and the one upon which the issue of
animal abuse principally turns.
The
legitimacy of deliberately inflicting
lesser pain to relieve greater pain in
others is based on a weak version of
the principle that the end justifies the
means.
If pain is an intrinsic evil,
then it wou Id seem obvious that we
should attempt to eliminate as much of
it as possible.
It might· therefore
seem that if we can eliminate greater
pain by inflicting lesser pain, we
should do it. On the other hand, if
pain is intrinsically evil, then it would
also seem that we should never inflict

108

it, that even relief of greater pain
could not justify deliberate infliction
of an intrinsic evil.
The principle
that pain is an intrinsic evil thus does
not seem, in and of itself, to provide
any clear· solution. to the question.
There are, however, several relevant
considerations which will help lead us
to a sol ution .
Fi rst of all, is the infliction of the
lesser pain the only means of relieving
the greater pain?
If not, it seems
quite clear, in terms of both utilita
rianism and the principle that pain is
an intrinsic evil, that such conduct
would be morally wrong.
Secondly, is the failure to prevent
or alleviate pain as morally wrong as
the deliberate infliction of it? If not,
then the greater seriousness of delib
erately inflicting pain might counter
balance the weight of the greater pain
which is not relieved, so that inflic
tion of the lesser pain would be mor
ally unjustified.
Thirdly, IS the being upon whom
the lesser pain is inflicted in any way
responsible for the greater pain which
is
being
relieved
or
prevented?
Self-defense would
be
a
typical
instance of this
case.
It seems
clearly justified, for example,
to
inflict lesser pain on an animal, by
whom one is being attacked, in order
to prevent suffering greater harm,
assuming, as already mentioned, that
there is no reasonably safe alternative
method of preventing the greater·
harm.
The same reasoning would apply
(with perhaps somewhat less force) to
the case of inflicting lesser pain on a
being to prevent greater harm to
someone else whom that being is
th reaten i ng.
It would appear, therefore, that we
can at least delimit three subcases
where the legitimacy of inflicting
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lesser suffering to relieve greater
suffering is determinable. It is never
morally justified to inflict pain to
relieve it if the latter pain could have
been relieved in some other way.
It
is always· morally justified to inflict
lesser pain on a being in self-defense
in order to prevent· greater pain from
being inflicted on oneself, where there
is no other way of preventing it.
Finally, it will in most cases be justi
fied to inflict lesser pain on one being
to prevent him .from inflicting greater
pain on someone else, again provided
that this is the only means of pre
venting it.
Where it. is a question of deliber
ately inflicting pain on a being who is
innocent, i.e., in no way responsible
for the greater pain one is attempting
to prevent or alleviate, things are, of
course, much more difficult, and here
our moral intuitions appear to be
ambiguous.
The smaller the pain
inflicted is in relation to the pain
relieved, the more we will be inclined
to regard it as justified. The greater
it is, the less likely that we will
regard it as justified.
It may be that
we would want to draw the line at
some point, maintaining that if the
ratio between the pain inflicted and
. the pain relieved is great enough,
then the principle is morally valid,
but otherwise not.
Such a position
would, of course, entail enormous,
perhaps insuperable pragmatic diffi
culties in properly calculating the pain
ratio in given concrete moral situ
ations, but is a coherent position in
theory.
Whatever we decide, how
ever, the principle must be applied
consistently if we are. not to be guilty
of moral hypocrisy.
Most of us are perfectly willing to
accept this principle without qualifica
tion as a maxim for action in the
world so long as· it is a non-human
who suffers the pain and a human
whose pain is relieved.
Few of us
would be willing to apply it without
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qualification to human beings.
Fewer
still would acknowledge that it is mor
ally justifiable to conduct painful
experiments on a human being to find
a cure for parvo in dogs.
Yet why
not?
I s there a relevant difference
between human and non-human animals
which would justify this preferential
treatment?
It seems quite clear, at
least in the case of the vast majority
of non-human animals, that there is
not.
There seems to be no morally
valid ground for
not consistently
applying the principle that relief of
greater suffering justifies infliction of
pain, and indeed, to demand, for the
sake of such consistency, that humans
be made to suffer equally for the
benefit of dogs and other non-human
animals.
If, on the other hand, for some
reason we are unwilling to subject
humans to such suffering, then we
must also refrain, if we do not wish
to be guilty of moral hypocrisy, from
inflicing it on non-human animals.
It
wou Id
therefore
seem
that
although this principle is clearly con
sistent with utilitarianism, and not
clearly inconsistent with the principle
that pain is an intrinsic evil, it
involves consequences which the vast
majority of us would be unwilling to
accept. 4
If this is so, then the only inflic
tion of pain on animals or anyone ele
which we may accept as morally justi
fiable is for defense or for the benefit
of the being himself. This conclusion
effectively eliminates as immoral the
overwhelming majority of ou r uses of
animals.

-2
Having examined, from the stand
point of these three viewpoints, the
various possible cases of inflicting
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pain, let us now look at the necessary
conditions cited in the replacement
argument for the moral justifiability of
inflicting pain on non-human animals.
There are two kinds of benefits
which proponents of this argument
believe compensate the animal.
The
first is the benefit of being able to
live out at least a portion of his natu
ral life in a condition in which there
is a preponderance of pleasure over
pain (premise #1). The second is the
"benefit of existence" (premise #2).
A little reflection upon these supposed
"benefits" reveals that in most cases
they are no benefits at all.
Permit
ting an animal to lead a semblance of
his natu ral life, rather than totally
thwarting his physical, psychological,
and behavioral needs--which is what
is usually meant by allowing the ani
mal to have a life "worth living"--is in
no way to bestow a benefit upon him,
but merely to refrain from a greater
evil. What unabashed pretension on
the pa rt of the· "concerned" fa rmer
and the "humane" experimenter (not
to mention the college professor who
supports them) to claim that they are
doing the animal a favor by allowing
him to live in somewhat the manner he
would live anyway, under natural
conditions, apart from their interfer
ence and exploitation. As Dale Jamie
son has pointed out, animals don't
need to be protected by ma n ; th ey
simply need to be left alone. To allow
animals to be what they are is not
magnanimity on man's part; it is sim
ple justice.
To do so is merely to
give animals their due. Were it not
for the fact that we live in a world in
which gross institutionalized abuse of
animals is the rule, rather than the
exception, such action would not even
merit commendation.
While the replacement argument as
given would, of course, allow a per
son to treat animals in a way which is
morally justified according to the
premise that pain is intrinsically evil,
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it in no way requires him to do so,
and indeed permits conduct of the
worst sort (i. e, . case #1) as analyzed
above.
For example: it is perfectly
compatible with the replacement agu
ment to wantonly and sadistically
engage in the periodic beating of a
dog which one has deliberately bred,
provided that such treatment does not
occur so often as to make the dog's
life on the whole more painful than
pleasurable.
The replacement argu
ment does not require that any good
whatever result from the infliction of
pain, whether for the animal or any
one else.
It does not even require
that one "compensate" the animal for
the useless pain inflicted upon it
(case #2).
It is sufficient that the
animal's life is on balance "worth liv
ing," even though one may have
reduced that animal's· level of happi
ness well below what it otherwise
wou Id have been
without thereby
increasing in the slightest anyone
else's happiness, or relieving anyone's
pain.
The objection might be made that
the replacement argument's second
premise--that the animal would not
have existed at all were it not for the
person who brought him into exis
tence--guarantees that the satisfaction
of the first premise--that the animal's
life is on the whole "worth living"--is
due, at least indi rectly, to the person
who inflicts the pain and that there
fore case #1 is excl uded by the
replacement argument.
The bestowal
of pleasure, in other words, which
"compensates" the dog for the inflic
tion of pain, even if provided directly
by others, is indirectly provided by
the "owner," insofar as he brought
the dog into existence and thereby
made it possible for others to bestow
benefits on him.
As
ludicrous as this objection
appears, let us suppose it is justified.
It would still be perfectly possible for
someone to inflict pain on an animal
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without di rectly bestowing any benefit
whatever upon it himself, so long as
there were others who were suffi
cienty concerned
to provide such
benefits, or the animal himself, due to
otherwise favorable conditions, was
able to preserve the balance of pleas
ure over pain in his own life.
All
that
the
replacement
argument
requires, in other words, for the
infliction of pain on animals, is satis
faction, in the weakest possible sense,
of the criteria cited in case #2.
But
that case, as we have seen, must be
rejected as immoral if we believe that
pain is an intrinsic evil, if we are
utilitarians, or if we· abide by our
ordinary moral intuitions.

-3
So far as the "benefit of existence"
in concerned, that product of skewed
logic has al ready been adequately
refuted by Peter Singer in Animal
Liberation,S more recent attempts to
resuscitate it notwithstandi ng. 6
As
Singer has poi nted out, there is no
being upon whom the "benefit of exis
tence" may be conferred. The root of
the error is a confusion between being
alive vs. being dead, and existing vs.
not existing. Aliveness and deadness
are both forms of existence. When a
being which was alive dies, it still
exists, although the form of its exis
tence has changed.
It is a lifeless
body rather than a live body. . It is
perfectly reasonable to speak of the
state of being alive as preferable to
the state of being dead, since in both
cases something exists which is the
"subject" of those states.
From the
vantage point of life, a comparison of
being alive with being dead can be
made.
No comparison can be made
between existing and not existing
since "a being which does not exist"
(a self-contradictory ph rase) is not in
any state which can be compared in
its quality to a state of existence. To

not exist is thus neither better nor
worse than to exist; it lies enti rely
outside the realm of values, is abso
Iutely qualityless.
Consequently, it
makes no sense whatsoever to speak
of benefiting a "non-existent being"
by bringing "it" into existence.
Singer,
however,
has come to
doubt the truth of h is former position
on the issue.
I n Practical Ethics he
states: "When I wrote Animal Libera
tion I accepted Salt's view. I thought
that it was absu rd to tal k as if one
conferred a favou r on a bei ng by
bringing it into existence, since at
the time one confers this favor, there
is no being at ali.
But now I am less
confident. . After all . . . we do seem
to do something bad if we knowingly
bring a miserable being into exis
tence, and if this is so, it is difficult
to explain why we do not do some
thing good when we knowingly bring a
happy being into existence. "7
This is one of the "assymetrical
relations" which has led Singer and
others into doubting his former posi
tion. The other is:
"If you harm a
being by ending its life, why do you
not benefit it by beginning its life?"
Puzzlement over this second relation is
more easily I'esolved than over the
fi rst.
The reason it is possible to
harm a being by ending its life is,
first, because there is a being which
has life and can be harmed, and sec
ond, because as living beings with
experience of dead beings, we are in
a position to judge the value of the
sate of aliveness as compared with the
state of deadness. Since all the evi
dence indicates that it is usually bet
ter to be alive than dead, we are
accustomed to believing that ending a
being's life harms him. In the case of
"non-existent
beings,"
neither
of
these is the case. There is no being
who can be benefited by bringing "it"
into existence, and there is no basis
of comparison,
as already
noted,
between non-existence and a state of
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existence.
The second "assymetrical relation"
is more complex. The answer to the
question, "Why is it not morally good
to bring a being into the world which
will be happy?" is quite simply that
prima facie, it is good to bring such a
being into the world (leaving aside
such relevant considerations as: how
one can be certain the being will be
happy,
how this might negatively
affect the happiness of others al ready
in the world,
the overpopu lation
problem, world hunger, etc.).
This
is not equivalent, however, to saying
that one benefits a "non-existent
being" by bringing "it" into the
world.
It is morally good to bring a being
into· the world which will be happy
because this act provides the possibil
ity for the benefit of happiness to be
bestowed upon the being, but it is
not itself a benefit bestowed upon the
being, since there is as yet no being
upon which to bestow It.
On. the other hand, it is morally
bad to bring a being into the world
which will be miserable because this
act provides the possibility for harm
to be inflicted upon the being, but,
similarly, it is not itself a harm
inflicted upon the being, since there
is as yet no being upon which to
inflict it.
The parallel thus proves that while
bringing a being into the world may
be a good or bad act depending on
whether the being will be happy or
miserable, it does not itself either
benefit or harm the being, but only
provides the possibility for benefiting
or harming the being. Thus the ben
efit of existence premise adds nothing
to the replacement argument to justify
the infliction of pain or death so far
as the animal is concerned. 8
It does
not offset, nor can it be weighed
against the animal's pain or death,

since non-existence cannot be meas
ured against a happy existence, nor,
for that matter, against a miserable
one. 9 It is neither better nor worse
to have existed than to have not
existed, for existence, in itself, is
neither good nor bad. 1 D
According to the replacement argu
ment,it would not be justified to kill
a deer born in the wild, even if the
deer could be replaced by one bred
for that purpose and its life on bal
ance was "worth living."
Yet how
does this case differ from that of a
factory farm pig? What has one given
the pig which one has not given the
deer? The answer, obviously, is "its
life." But as we have seen, existence
in itself is neither good nor bad. It
depends on how the animal is treated
after . it is brought into existence.
Giving it its life may even be morally
wrong if one intends to ill treat it,
for one thereby provides the opportu
nity for that ill-treatment.
Hence
giving the pig life is in no sense to
bestow a benefit upon it.
Conse
quently, if one treated the pig and
deer equally well, there would be no
more justification, in terms of the ani
mals themselves; 11 for killing the pig
than for killing the deer.
-4

What of the second claim that the
replacement
argument purports
to
prove, namely, that given the condi
tions cited above, the infliction of
death upon an animal is justified? It
is obvious that the replacement argu-:
ment assumes that the lives of non
human animals have no intrinsic value
apart from the animals' capacity to
experience pleasure and pain. In this
it is consistent with classical uitlitari
anism, which reduces good and evil to
pleasure and pain.
The assumption
that pain is the only moral issue at
stake in the killing of an animal is
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grossly counter-intuitive, although a
utilitarian would try to show, of
course, that all forms of intrinsic
value which might be attributed to
animals' lives are reducible to forms of
pleasure.
The
replacement
argument
as
stated, however, quite clearly fails to
justify the infliction of death on non
human animals, just as it fails to jus
tify the infliction of pain.
I n this
regard, too, it is inconsistent with
the assumption that pain is an intrin
sic evil, with classical utilitarianism,
and with our ordinary moral intui
tions.
I n the fi rst place, so. fa r as the
animal itself is concerned, it fails to
exclude the unjustified infliction of
pain in the process of killing.
I nfiic
tion of pa i nfu I death, with no good
whatsoever resulting for anyone else,
is
perfectly
compatible
with
the
replacement a rgument, provided that
the pain involved is not so great as to
make the animal's life asa whole more
painful than pleasurable.
One must also take into account the
pain of those who may be affected by
the animal's death. The most obvious
way in which an animal's death could
cause pain to others in the world,
whether human or non-human,
is
th rough thei r sense of loss or mou rn
ing for that animal.
It is ludicrous to
suppose that this pain can be elimi
nated by simply replacing the animal
with another.
Even if one kills the
animal
painlessly,
that
killing
is
unjustified if it results in pain to
another unless it also results in the
relief of greater suffering for that
being.
The replacement argument,
however, quite clearly permits inflic
tion of incidental pain on someone else
as a result of the killing of an animal
without rei ief of greater s ufferi ng.
The pain of those affected by the
animal's death directly is not what

E&A 111/4

proponents of the replacement argu
ment are chiefly concerned with, how
ever.
They speak instead
of a
reduction in the "total level of happi
ness" in the world.
To kill a happy
being is· to reduce this level and
thereby i ndi rectly the happiness level
of those who remain in the world.
The presumption is that the more
happiness there is in the world, in a
quantitative sense, the happier are
the individuals who inhabit it.
The
dubiousness of this assumption has
already been pointed out above. 12
The concept of the "total level . of.
happiness" would seem to be a largely
mean ingless abstraction.
This, how
ever, is the apparent reason for the
introduction of the thi rd condition for
inflicting pain and death on animals,
namely, that it be replaced after its
death by another happy animal.
This premise, together with the
"benefit of existence" premise, guar-·
antees that the world's stock of hap
piness will not be reduced by the
killing of the animal.
For the animal
being killed was deliberately added to
the world in the first place by the
person killing it, and another such
animal will be added to the world to
replace it when it is gone.
It is obvious, however, that pre
serving the same level of total happi
ness in the world in no way justifies
the pain
inflicted
on the world
through the killing of animals bred· for
that purpose. That pain is in no wise
an unavoidable means to the relief of
greater suffering of the animals them
selves or of human beings whose suf
fering is caused by those animals.
The
replacement argument thus
permits
killing
of
animals . which
involves infliction of unjustified pain:
to the animals themselves, to others
who care about them, and to "the
world."
Even without raising the
question as to whether there are not
other moral issues than pain involved
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in the killing of animals, it is obvious
that the replacement argument fails to
justify such killing.
-5

Assuming we grant that pain is an
intrinsic evil, our analysis has shown
that the replacement argument as
given· is insufficient to justify the
infliction of pain and death on non
human animals.
I have also tried to
demonstrate that it is inconsistent
with
classical
utilitarianism,
from
which it derives, and that if con sis
tently followed, involves consequences
which few of us would be willing to
accept.
Can the replacement argument be
modified in such a way as to square
with the assumption that pain is an
intrinsic evil, with utilitarianism, and
with ou r ordi na ry moral i ntu itions,
while still allowing us to use and kill
animals for human benefit?
Let us
recall our conclusions regarding the
cases in which the deliberate infliction
of pain is morally justified. It is jus
tified, we said, to inflict lesser pain
on a being which is threatening us or
someone else with greater pain, pro
vided that this is the only way to
prevent the greater pain.
Secondly,
it is justified to inflict lesser pain on
a being if it is the only means of pre
venting. greater pain in the being
himself. 13
It should be obvious that these
criteria effectively eliminate as immoral
all use of animals for human benefit
which involves any infliction of pain
whatsoever.
Some uses of animals
. might still be morally permitted, for
example, the keeping of free roving
chickens for eggs, and the use of
certain animals for farming or other
labor, where the animal is not over
worked, and is provided with all nec
essary care, a natural environment,

and the means of satisfying his social,
psychological,
and physical needs.
Study of animals in simulated natural
envi ronments and even a limited range
of non-painful, non-stressful experi
ments might also be permitted by
these principles.
Consumption of the
bodies of animals which have died a
natural death would also involve no
violation of these criteria. 14
Quite
clea rly, however, the vast majority of
our uses of live animals for supposed
human benefit would have to be elimi
nated if my reasoning is correct and
we are at all concerned to act morally.
Such a fundamental change in our
life-style would ideally be a major step
toward the ultimate goal of ceasing
altogether, insofar as possible, to
interfere in the lives of other animals.
What about killing?
Since it is
extremely dubious whether painless
killing is possible (or at least practi
cable), this requirement alone might
prohibit all killing of animals for
human benefit.
Let us assume,
however,
that
painless killing is possible.
Can the
replacement argument be revised in
such a way as to ci rcumvent the
problem of the incidental pain caused
to others and to "the world" by the
killing of the animal? So far as the
first point is concerned, the sugges
tion might be made that the animal
could be raised in isolation both from
humans and from his own kind, so as
to avoid the problem of pain caused to
others. In the case of many animals,
however, this solution would betray·
the criteria in a different way.
For
any animals which have social instincts
(and how many of them don't?) would
surely suffer psychological pain under
such circumstances, pain which would
not be justified by relief from greater
suffering for the animals themselves.
Two other possible solutions, how
ever, come to mind, neither of which
would appear to be
beyond the
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ingenuity of those who are determined
to use animals for human benefit.
One might breed the animal selectively
in such a way as to eliminate the
social instinct or to cause brain dam
age sufficient to make the animal obli
vious to his normal social needs. To
be· sure, this has not yet been done,
but there is no reason to presume it
is beyond the reach of scien·ce.
Or
one might allow the animal social con
tact with his own kind (while conceal
ing its existence from humans), but
kill them all at slaughter time.
Short of these solutions, any kill
ing of an animal which caused inci
dental suffering to others could only
be justified if it was the only means
to the relief of their greater suffer
ing.
What about the pain inflicted on
the world? To begin with, this notion
is arguably incoherent.
It seems
clear that "the world" cannot mean
ingfully be regarded as a super-indi
vidual, and that the total level of
happiness in the world is· no gauge of
the average level of. happiness of the
individuals in the world. Moreover, it
seemS patently absurd to maintain that
a reduction in this total level of hap
piness in. the world will have an
impact on the happiness of all the
individuals in the world.
How could
the loss of happiness inflicted on the
world through the removal of a single
animal possibly filter down to. all the
other individuals?
It follows from this that the pain
inflicted on the world through the
killing of animals is, at most, pain
inflicted on some individuals who are
in a position to be negatively affected
in one way or another by that killing.
But it is difficu It to see who these
individuals could be unless they are
the very beings already discussed,
who suffer loss from the killing of the
animal.
Thus the same conclusions
would apply.
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If we presume that animals can be
killed painlessly, then it is theoreti
cally possible to modify the replace
ment argument in such a way as to
square with the principle that pain is
an intrinsic evil.
The modifications
necessary, however, would virtualy
eliminate, or render impracticable, the
ach ievement of its original pu rpose,
namely, to justify the continued use
of animals for human benefit.

Moreover, the replacement argu
ment would still
rest upon other
assumptions
which
are
extremely
questionable: that animals' lives are
intrinsically worthless apart from their
capacity to experience pleasu re and
pain, and that the prevention of an
animal's future pleasure is not morally
wrong.
All that is necessary to recognize
the questionableness of these assump
tions is to apply the test of our ordi
nary moral intuitions to the revised
version. Would we be willing to con
sistently apply
this
argument
to
human beings? We may presume that
human lives are generally of greater
value than non-human lives and that
for them pain is not the only consid
eration.
It is equally obvious, how
ever, that not all human lives· are of
greater value than ali animal lives.
Would
we
be
willing,
then,
to
acknowledge the moral· legitimacy of
breeding mentally retarded humans for
human use so long as they were
spared suffering,
killed painlessly,
and
replaced
by
other
defective
humans?
If not, then I would draw
the conclusion to which this whole
enquiry has been tending, namely,
that while animals' lives unquestion
ably differ significantly in value, and
no doubt are generally inferior in
value to human lives, each and every
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one is unique.
able. "

No animal is "replace
"replace-

7

Practical

Ethics,

p.

100.

8
It is, however, relevant to the
question of the "total level of happi
happiness in the world."
See below, p.
113.

George P. Cave
Trans-Species Unlimited

Even if the conferral of existence
were a benefit, however, it is obvious
that this benefit does not result from
the infliction of pain or death and
consequently can in no way justify it.
9
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To maintain consistency, classical
utilitarianism has to admit, in theory,
the moral legitimacy of inter-species
comparisons of utility and the possi
possibility of inflicting lesser pain on
humans in order to relieve greater
pain in non-humans.
Traditionally,
however, utilitarians have tried to
circumvent
these
conclusions
by
appealing to other considerations rele
relevant to the determination of the total
quantity of pain involved, e.g., the
painful. effect on a person's friends
and relatives etc.
That utilitarians
have felt compelled to resort to all
sorts of clever means of forestalling
the conclusions which follow from their
own reasoning confirms the fact that
the principle in question violates our
moral intuitions, at least once we rec
recognize its full implications.
4

s
6

ff.

Animal Liberation, p.

241.

Ethics & Animals, op. cit., pp. 53

lOam not contradicti ng here my
former claim that it is possible to
compare being alive with being dead.
The quality of the state of being alive
usually makes it better .than the state
of being dead.
Mere existence, how
however, no matter what state of exis
existence one is speaking of, is not in
itself good or bad.
11

See below, p. 113.

12

See above, p. 107.

13
With human beings, however, it
would also be morally required to
obtain their consent.
The impossibil
impossibility of doing so in the case of non-hu
non-human animals makes ou r responsibilty
for being absolutely certain. that we
are acting in their own best interest
in inflicting pain on them all the more
grave.
14 This is not to condone any of these
practices, but merely to point out that
they are not inconsistent with the
assumption upon which the present
argument is based, namely, that pain
is an intrinsic evil.
I n my· view ani
animals' rights are by no means limited
to freedom from unnecessary pain and
death, but include, at least to some
degree, freedom of movement, satis
satisfaction of behavioral needs, freedom
from
genetic
manipulation,
and
respectfu I treatment of thei r bodies.

